Home / Dossiers / Antony J. Blinken
Published by the Commonwealth of Humanity Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity
Date: May 27, 2026
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This page is an individualized public dossier for one named accused person appearing in the Indictment. It is not yet a complete archive-grade case file. Its purpose is to isolate the present public record strongest for Antony J. Blinken by person, office, timeframe, responsibility theory, claim grading, and cited evidence.
Accused
Antony J. Blinken -- former United States Secretary of State
Scope of this dossier
This dossier focuses on Blinken's role as Secretary of State, principal U.S. diplomatic officer, and senior foreign-policy advocate for Israel's Gaza war after 7 October 2023. It does not attempt to prove every allegation in the Indictment or every consequence of the war. It focuses on the public record presently strongest for individualized accusation tied to Blinken's official conduct, statements, travel, legal-political representations, and diplomatic shielding while he remained in office.
Timeframe
The primary period assessed here is 7 October 2023 through 20 January 2025. The evidentiary center of gravity is the period from Blinken's initial public commitment of U.S. backing for Israel through the famine-warning period, the National Security Memorandum 20 process, and the late Biden-administration diplomatic defense of continued support.
Responsibility theory
This dossier alleges responsibility at the level of Secretary of State, chief diplomatic representative, senior policy advocate, and senior official involved in arms-transfer and foreign military financing policy. It does not assume Blinken selected each weapon or directed Israeli operations. It asks whether he used the State Department's institutional power to sustain military support, diplomatic protection, and public legal-political defenses of Israel's campaign after repeated notice of starvation risk, civilian harm, and alleged international crimes.
Claim grading
Established
Antony J. Blinken publicly and repeatedly affirmed U.S. solidarity with Israel after 7 October 2023, traveled repeatedly to Israel and the region to support that policy, defended continued U.S. military support, argued against major international accountability measures directed at Israeli leaders, and publicly acknowledged only limited U.S. constraints even after severe humanitarian warnings and findings of likely international humanitarian law failures.
Strongly inferred
Blinken's continuation of military-diplomatic backing after repeated notice strongly supports the inference that he materially enabled and diplomatically shielded foreseeable Israeli crimes in Gaza, even though the complete internal record on particular transfers, legal advice, and causal contribution is not public on this page.
Provisional
The further claim that Blinken is individually liable under international criminal law for aiding and abetting war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide remains provisional here. Public evidence shows office, advocacy, continuation, and notice. It does not by itself fully establish mens rea, the complete internal advisory record, or the full causal chain for final individualized legal judgment.
Evidence record
Official State Department acts
[A] On 10 October 2023, the State Department announced Blinken's travel to Israel and Jordan, stating that he would reaffirm U.S. solidarity with Israel, discuss measures to bolster Israel's security, and underscore unwavering U.S. support for Israel's right to defend itself. This is a direct official record showing that support for Israel's military and diplomatic position was central to Blinken's first wartime trip.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Blinken's Travel to Israel and Jordan," October 10, 2023. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] Before departing for Israel on 11 October 2023, Blinken said the United States had Israel's back, that significant military assistance requested by Israel was already on the way, and that the administration was working with Congress to make sure Israel had what it needed. He also linked U.S. deterrent deployments in the region to support for Israel. This is a direct public statement by Blinken tying his office to continued military and diplomatic backing.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken Before Departing Joint Base Andrews," October 11, 2023. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] On 12 October 2023 in Tel Aviv, Blinken said the United States was delivering ammunition, Iron Dome interceptors, and other defense materiel, and would work with Congress to meet Israel's evolving defense needs. He also said Israel had the right and obligation to defend itself and ensure that 7 October would not happen again. This is one of the clearest official records tying Blinken personally to urgent U.S. military support in the early phase of the Gaza war.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken At a Press Availability," October 12, 2023. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] In the same Tel Aviv visit, Blinken said the United States would continue standing with Israel and explicitly framed the issue as a moment for "moral clarity." He also said Israel had the right to defend itself and that the United States would be by its side. This matters because the record is not merely one of logistical support, but of public legal-political endorsement delivered in Israel during wartime.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their Meeting," October 12, 2023. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] By January 2024, after months of mass civilian harm and major humanitarian alarms, Blinken continued describing U.S. support for Israel's core war aims as essential to ensuring that 7 October would never happen again. He also publicly rejected the South Africa v. Israel genocide filing as "meritless." This shows continued diplomatic defense of Israel alongside opposition to a major international legal challenge while Blinken remained in direct policy authority.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability," January 9, 2024. 2021-2025.state.gov
Arms transfers, certifications, and emergency determinations
[A] The primary public record on this page establishes that Blinken repeatedly defended and advanced continued U.S. military support for Israel. On 11 October 2023 he said significant military assistance requested by Israel was on the way, and on 12 October 2023 he said the United States was already delivering ammunition, Iron Dome interceptors, and other defense materiel. This establishes direct advocacy and public confirmation of continuing support, even where a complete transfer-by-transfer archive is not yet attached here.
Source: State Department archive, October 11, 2023 remarks. 2021-2025.state.gov; Source: State Department archive, October 12, 2023 press availability. 2021-2025.state.gov
[B] A fuller archive-grade dossier should attach preserved primary records for the December 2023 emergency arms-transfer determinations associated with Israel and any related congressional notifications or State Department certifications. Our staff did not obtain live-verifiable direct archive pages for those determinations during drafting, so this page does not overstate them as established fact from primary records alone. Their absence is logged as an evidentiary gap rather than silently filled by assumption.
Source: State Department archive collection page for "Situation in the Middle East," accessed May 27, 2026. 2021-2025.state.gov
Diplomatic protection and United Nations record
[A] Under Blinken's State Department, the U.S. mission to the United Nations continued to oppose ceasefire texts that the administration viewed as insufficiently tied to hostage release or otherwise contrary to its diplomatic position. On 20 November 2024, the U.S. explanation of vote stated that the United States could not support a resolution because it viewed an unconditional ceasefire as failing to secure hostage release and as sending a dangerous message to Hamas. This is an official U.S. record of diplomatic shielding within Blinken's tenure, even though it was delivered by the U.S. mission rather than by Blinken personally.
Source: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, "Explanation of Vote on a UN Security Council Resolution on the Situation in the Middle East," November 20, 2024. usun.usmission.gov
[A] On 13 August 2024, the U.S. mission reiterated that Israel had a right to pursue Hamas while also calling for a ceasefire tied to the hostage deal framework. This matters because it records the continuing U.S. diplomatic formula inside the United Nations system: support for Israeli military aims, paired with criticism of civilian harm and pressure for a mediated deal, but not a break with the underlying support structure.
Source: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, "Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East," August 13, 2024. usun.usmission.gov
Public legal and policy representations
[A] On 12 May 2024, after the administration's National Security Memorandum 20 reporting process, Blinken said it was "reasonable to assess" that in certain instances Israel had acted inconsistently with international humanitarian law, but he also said the administration had not drawn definitive conclusions, that Israel had accountability processes, and that the United States was not broadly pausing weapons beyond a specific bomb hold linked to Rafah. He further said the answer was no when asked if the United States was slowing delivery of other weapons. This is a core legal-policy record because it captures Blinken's public defense of continued support after acknowledging likely failures.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Margaret Brennan of CBS's Face the Nation," May 12, 2024. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] On 20 May 2024, Blinken publicly rejected the ICC prosecutor's warrant applications against senior Israeli officials, called the prosecutor's equivalence of Israel and Hamas shameful, challenged ICC jurisdiction, and said the decision could jeopardize ceasefire and humanitarian efforts. This is a direct public act of legal-political advocacy against international accountability for Israeli leadership during the Gaza campaign.
Source: State Department archive, "Warrant Applications by the International Criminal Court," May 20, 2024. 2021-2025.state.gov
Public notice and international warnings
[A] The ICJ case record for Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) shows provisional-measures orders on 26 January, 28 March, and 24 May 2024. Those orders are directly relevant to notice. Whatever the final merits outcome, they publicly placed Israel's Gaza campaign under repeated judicial scrutiny while Blinken continued in office and continued defending the underlying U.S. support structure.
Source: International Court of Justice case record, Case 192. icj-cij.org
[A] OCHA's March 2024 humanitarian access snapshot states that famine was imminent in Gaza, that 1.1 million people were facing catastrophic food insecurity, and that only 26 per cent of requested humanitarian food missions in areas requiring coordination with Israeli forces were facilitated in March. It also describes persistent access restrictions and denials by Israeli authorities. This is high-value notice evidence for Blinken because it was public during the period when he continued pressing support and diplomacy without a decisive break.
Source: OCHA OPT, "Humanitarian Access Snapshot - Gaza Strip | 1-31 March 2024," April 6, 2024. ochaopt.org
[A] On 18 March 2024, the World Food Programme said famine in northern Gaza was no longer a remote warning, that 1.1 million people were experiencing catastrophic hunger, and that the crisis was "all manmade." This did not, by itself, identify Blinken as a perpetrator. It did place his office on unmistakable public notice of the stakes while support and diplomatic protection continued.
Source: World Food Programme, "Hunger in Gaza: Famine findings a 'dark mark' on the world, says WFP Palestine Country Director," March 18, 2024. wfp.org
Underlying principal-crime record
[A] The ICJ proceedings, OCHA reporting, and WFP warning above establish that the alleged principal crimes were not hidden from public view. By early 2024, the record already included judicial intervention, famine warnings, severe access restrictions, and persistent reporting of mass civilian suffering. That is enough for this page to treat the notice environment as established, even though a fuller principal-crime section would also attach preserved ICC records and a broader humanitarian archive.
Source: International Court of Justice case record, Case 192. icj-cij.org; Source: OCHA OPT, April 6, 2024. ochaopt.org; Source: World Food Programme, March 18, 2024. wfp.org
Continued support after notice
[A] After the famine and humanitarian warnings of early 2024, Blinken continued publicly defending both Israel's war aims and the broader U.S. support structure. On 1 May 2024 in Ashdod, he said the administration had seen real progress in aid flows but also repeated that Hamas remained the obstacle to the ceasefire deal and that the United States was focused on sustaining and accelerating assistance without breaking the core support policy. Days later, on 12 May, he said the administration was not slowing broader weapons deliveries beyond the specific bomb hold tied to Rafah. The continuity of support after notice is therefore established at the level of public policy sequence and public defense.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability," May 1, 2024. 2021-2025.state.gov; Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Margaret Brennan of CBS's Face the Nation," May 12, 2024. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] On 14 January 2025, near the end of his tenure, Blinken said the administration's primary post-October 7 goals had included helping Israel defend itself and preventing another 7 October. He also described over a dozen regional trips and argued that U.S. diplomatic and military action had helped preserve Israel's deterrence. The importance of this late statement is that it retrospectively confirms, in Blinken's own words, that sustaining Israel's military position was a central organizing aim of his diplomacy throughout the war period.
Source: State Department archive, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken: 'Toward the Promise of a More Integrated Middle East,'" January 14, 2025. 2021-2025.state.gov
Rebuttals, defenses, and alternative explanations
[A] Blinken repeatedly framed U.S. policy in terms of Israel's right to defend itself, the need to prevent another 7 October, hostage recovery, and humanitarian mitigation. These are not self-clearing defenses, but they are central to the official record because they show the administration's claimed legal and strategic rationale for continued support.
Source: State Department archive, October 11, 2023 remarks. 2021-2025.state.gov; Source: State Department archive, October 12, 2023 press availability. 2021-2025.state.gov
[A] The State Department also pointed to humanitarian work, maritime and land aid routes, visa restrictions on violent West Bank actors, and regional diplomacy as evidence that it was trying to restrain or mitigate harms. The visa restriction policy of 5 December 2023 is relevant because it shows Blinken was willing to use U.S. tools against some Israeli or pro-Israeli actors in the West Bank while still maintaining the broader Gaza support structure. That complicates the record, but it does not negate the continued military-diplomatic backing documented elsewhere on this page.
Source: State Department archive, "Announcement of Visa Restriction Policy to Promote Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank," December 5, 2023. 2021-2025.state.gov; Source: State Department archive, May 1, 2024 press availability. 2021-2025.state.gov
Evidentiary limits and open questions
This page does not yet include preserved primary copies of every State Department arms-transfer determination, all congressional notification records, internal legal advice, dissent cables, National Security Memorandum 20 underlying review materials, or a full set of U.N. explanation-of-vote records across the entire period. Our staff also did not obtain a live-verifiable archived State Department page for the report to Congress itself under NSM-20, although Blinken discussed its conclusions in a public interview cited above.
Those missing records matter most for the strongest legal conclusions: what Blinken personally signed in emergency authorities, what internal advice he received, whether subordinates recommended more forceful restrictions, and how much leverage he had but declined to use. The absence of those materials is one reason this page treats criminal-liability conclusions as provisional rather than established.
Assessment
Established: Blinken used the State Department to provide and defend diplomatic, military, and legal-political support for Israel after 7 October 2023; repeatedly traveled to reinforce that policy; opposed or criticized major international accountability measures against Israeli leaders; and continued this posture after repeated judicial and humanitarian warnings concerning starvation risk, access denial, and civilian harm in Gaza.
Strongly inferred: the public record strongly supports the inference that Blinken materially enabled and diplomatically shielded foreseeable Israeli crimes by sustaining support after public notice had become acute, even though the public record does not disclose every internal transfer decision, legal discussion, or private warning.
Provisional: the further claim that Blinken is individually liable for aiding and abetting war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide should remain open to additional proof and challenge until a fuller record exists concerning intent, legal advice, particular emergency determinations, classified transfers, causal contribution, and contrary evidence.
Source preservation notes
This public page cites source URLs but does not yet prove full archive-grade preservation. A complete case file should retain copies, retrieval dates, hashes where available, and screenshots or transcripts as derivatives rather than originals. Classified, sealed, unavailable, or contested records should be identified as unavailable rather than inferred. Where source pages are likely to change, official archived pages should be preferred where available.
Status
This page is an example public dossier. It should be expanded, challenged, corrected, and preserved if the Commonwealth develops a fuller case-file system.